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critica l role o f lowe r-le ve l participants in the policy-making and p olicy-implementing process. Such officials -for instance, the police, magistrates, school administrators and local co un cil membe rs -are a lso 'elites'. Un li ke Members of Parliament, however, they are not necessarily more tolerant than the public. Moreover, their role in defining the co ntent of ind ividu a l-l evel political freedom may be as great or greater than that of nationa l-l evel legislative officia ls.
On balance, however, it seems fa ir to conclude that political elites pl aya particularly significant role in protecting democratic rights in Britain. Our da ta indicate that high levels of a ttitudinal tolerance prevai l amo ng Members of Parliament. This finding con, firm s the existence of the principal factua l prerequisite of a theory p osi ting the special responsibility of political elites for preserving civil liberties. Given the critical policymaking ro le o f Members of Parliament, it is reaso nab le to conclude that but for their act ive pa rti cipa ti o n in the policy-making process, the stat us of politica l freedom in Britain wou ld be less secure th an it is.
CO N C L U S I ON T he foregoing specul at ion may capture, in part, the dynamic process that defines the status of political freedom in Britain. A majority of citize ns would not allow a member of their least-liked group to run fo r public office, form a lawful o rga ni zatio n, or hold a public rally. At the sa me time, citizens direct their a ntipathy a t a diverse ra ther than hom ogeneous se t of groups. Moreover, a ttitudin a l tolerance is substa ntia lly more prevalent a m ong Members of Parliament than amo ng members of the public. These findings, combined with objective ev idence that t he stat us of politica l freedom in Brita in is satisfactory, are consistent with the conclusion that the politica l elites are primarily responsible for safeg uardi ng and perpetuating the principles of democracy in Britain.
I
presidential elections. I A common goal for these studies is the development of a model, inevitably based on aggregate time-series data, which predicts election returns. The resulting models, some of which are quite accurate, can differ a good deal in specification and estimation. Also, they vary in complexity, making them more or less accessible to the engaged voter.
Some forecasters suggest such models should be relatively easy to understand and use, in order that citizens can utilize them.
2 Nevertheless, this still implies work ing with prediction equations, a tall order to impose on the American public. But, fortunately, many citizens seem to know what is going to happen already, without resort to statistical formulas. After all, in everyday life, there are many things we 'know', even in the absence of experts or charts.
In politics, citizens assert they know things, as when they say 'everyone knows' Rea ga n will be re-elected. But, is such an assertion true? That is, before the 1984 presidential election, did 'everyone' (or 'almost everyone') say that Reagan would win? In general, can the American electorate forecast the presidential victor, well before the event? If so, why a re American voters able to forecast presidential contests to the extent they can? Is it because of 'luck " 'bias" 'connections', 'education', 'closeness to election day', or some other reason? These questions, along with the general implications of citizen forecasting, will be explored below.
C AN V OTE RS FORE C AST TH E PR E SID EN TIAL WINNER ?
Data on the dependent variable come from a rather neglected item in the National Election Studies: 'Who do you think will be elected President in November?' This question has been posed in presidential pre-election surveys since 1956. The answers allow us to estimate how well the electorate forecasted the winner in each of these presidenti al contests. What should we expect the estimates to look like? In some ways, the null hypothesis is most plausible. Tha t is, citizens do not possess crysta l balls, therefore their guesses will be essentially random, with some having 'good luck' and others having 'bad luck'. Thus, in the sample as a whole about 50 per cent should guess right, the other 50 per cent wrong, given the basic two-candidate character of the races. Do the data support this null hypothesis? Yes, for 1976, where there was a n al most even split between Carter and Ford, with 52 per cent 'ca lling' Carter. However, evidence from other years suggests that citizen forecasting is anythi ng but random {see Figure I ). In the most recent contest, 87 per cent correctly foresaw that Reagan would best Mondale. With certain other elections, the accuracy is even greater. For instance, in 1964 fully 92 per cent predicted that Johnson would triumph over Goldwater. This seems an extremely clear example of the talked-about pre-election situation in whch 'everyone knows' the outcome. Overall, averaging across these eight surveys, an estimated 69 per cent of the voters correctly forecasted the presidential winner. Moreover, and more important, they made their forecasts well before the election. In fact, it is typically about a month before. (Looking at the median interview time for each survey, 7 October is the middle date.) Obviously, much more than 'luck' is behind these guesses. Below, we evaluate various hypotheses about the determinants of forecasting ability, looking first at political factors, then at social and situational ones. 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 What kinds of politica l actio ns or attitudes might enhance forecasting skills? Certainly not partisanship itself, which merely induces bias into individual forecasts (e.g., strong Republican identifiers tend to predict Republican winners). However, once party bias is controlled for, a politically a ctive citizen might be at an advantage in various ways as a forecaster. According to political lore, 'insiders' know what is 'really going on'. Active political participants -those who work in campaigns, atte nd meetings, try to influence others, give money -a re certainly more 'inside' the process than others. Even those whose participat ion is more passive, but w ho express much 'interest' in politics, ought to be more knowledgable forecasters. Besides participation, political involvement manifests itself in information-seeking. We hypothesize that voters who follow (o r are at least exposed to) election news in the media -television, radio, newspapers -are more likely to be able to forecast accurately. After all, they would seem to have more information, which should lead to more understanding. Indeed, to the degree voters see the electoral process as less complica ted, we reason that they should be better forecasters. • The codes, consistent across the surveys, are as follows: PID ( + I = partisan identification that coincides with that of the eventual winner, 0 = independent, and -I = party identification that is the same as the eventual loser); Partic. (an additive index ranging from 0 to 4, in which respondents were assigned a I for doing any of the following acts of participation: contributing money, working for a candidate, trying to influence others, or attending a political meeting); Interest (3 = a great deal of interest in the campaign, 2 = some interest in the campaign, and I = little or no interest in the presidential campaign); Media (an addi tive index ranging from 0 to 3, in which each respondent was assigned a score depending upon whether or not he reported having watched news about the campaign on television, heard something about the race on the radio, or read about the campaign in newspapers); Complic. (I = believes that politics are too complicated to understand, and 0 = does not believe that politics are too complicated). The dependent variable, 'Forecast', is coded + I (a correct forecast) and -I (a n incorrect forecast). The numbers in parentheses are I-ratios.
t indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level, two tail.
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The foregoi ng suggests a political m odel, where forecasting accuracy is a function of pa rticipation, interest , media use, and perceived complexity (after controlling for party identificat ion bias). Table 1 shows the ordinary least sq uare (OLS) estimates for such a model, for each presidential pre-election survey from 1956-1984. (Probit and logit procedures were also applied, yielding estimates which virtually duplicate statistical significance values arrived at herein.) Our global hypothesis -political involvement leads to better fo recas ts -fails to be supported. The coefficients of the relevant variables -participation, interest, media, complexity -are inconsistently signed, and seldom achieve statistical significa nce (a t 0.05). These essentially null findings persisted, despite serious efforts to challenge them. (That is, the variables were also included singly and in different combinations; various interaction effects were explored; alternative indexes were tried; other controls, such as educa tion a nd vote intention, were applied.) One conclusion seems hard to avoid: politically attentive publics do not distinguish themselves as political forecasters] SKILL AT FORE C ASTING : E DU C ATION AND TIMING DO HELP Political attributes may not help one's forecasting skills, but certain sociological ones do. In particular, educational attainment matters. The more formal education the voter has, the better at presidential forecasting he or she is. In almost all of these pre-election surveys, the educat ion va riable has a highly significant coefficient, even after the imposition of a rigorous control variable, 'vote intention'. (It could be argued that this control is essential, in order to avoid 'rationalization' of the forecast.) More particularly, for six of the eight elect ions, the education coefficient is decidedly significant, with an average positive I-rat io of about 4.0. Why does more education relate to a voter's forecasting abi lity? Certain ly, it would seem to have little, if anything, to do with know ledge directly acquired in school. The process is more subtle. Greater education tends to bring a more extensive social network a nd thus more extensive social knowledge. When queried about the course of major national events like elections, those with more schooling can bring tools to bear, and yield up somewhat more accurate judgements. Furthermore, the more educated, because of their greater training, are perhaps more efficient seekers a nd gatherers of the relevant information. At bottom, of course, is Jefferson's notion that a bettereducated citizenry makes for a better democracy.
In trying to account for individual forecasting ability, we have thus far focused on the activities and characteristics of voters themselves, especially their politics and sociology. We have ignored features of the task itself. But, it is obvious that certain situational variables can vary the difficulty of the forecast. 'Lead time' is a very important factor affecting political forecasting accuracy.· How long is it until the event to be forecast? In these NES J Another possible variab le to predict forecast accuracy would be whether a voter had been fo llowing th e polls. U nfortunately, this question was never asked in these NES data (with the exception of a 1980 panel). However, we do have plentiful data on media usage, which would be the vehicle for poll-watching. The media variable (see Table I ) is significan t in only two of the eight contests. Th us, while information about polls is ava il ab le almost exclusively through the media, the tendency to be a heavy media co nsume r makes little difference in ou r model. Furt hermore, and perhaps more important, there is evidence that, although poll stories have become a much more common news eve nt over time (e.g., the number of poll sto ries on American network television news broadcasts more than doubled between 1972 and 1980), the overall ability of the electorate to predict the winner of presidential elect ions follows no such time trend (see Figure 1) . • The codes, co nsistent ac ross the surveys, a re as follows: PID (+ I = partisa n ident ificati on that coincides with that of the eventual winner of the presidentia l election, 0 = independent. -I = pa rtisan identification th a t coincides with that of the eventua l loser); Vo te Inte nti on ( I = respondent intends to vote for the candidate who will win the election in November, and 0 = the respondent intends to vote for the eventual loser); Education (5 = college grad uate, 4 = attended some college, 3 = high school graduate, 2 = some high school, and 1 = grade school or less); and Time (da te of interview, I = September 15 or before, 2 = after September 15 a nd before October 1,3 = between October 1 and October 15, a nd 4 = after October 15). The dependent variable, 'Forecast', is coded + 1 for a correct forecast of the election winner a nd -1 for a n incorrect forecast. The numbers in parentheses are (-ratios.
t indica ted statistical significance at the 0.05 level, one tail.
pre-election studies, interviews began as early as the first of September. We hypothesize that the nearer the National Election Study pre-election interview to the November vote, the more accu rate the forecast. The results in Table 2 show there is some support for this hypothesis. In five of the eight elections, nearness of the interview to election day was significantly (if rather modestly) related to forecasting accuracy. More specifically, the average slope estimate (viewed as a linear probability coefficient) for the Time' variable implies that for every two weeks closer to the election, the likelihood of a correct forecast rises by almost 4 per cent.
INDIVIDUAL FORECASTS AND MACRO -DATA: EMERGENT PROP E RTI E S
Following the model specification in Table 2 , the voter's presidential forecast is a function of educational attainment and lead time, plus partisanship and vote intention. These estimates indicate that individual forecasting is subject to explanation. When voters are asked to predict the presidential winner, many simply voice their biases, either short-term or long-term (i.e., either vote intention or party identification). Beyond that, though, they draw on their advantages from education and proximity to the event. These are useful results, for they help locate a group of citizens who are more likely to 'know what is happening' politically. Clearly, some voters a re more able forecasters than others. These findings are enticing, but rather slim. While political biases are clearly important determinants, they are not attributes which actually enhance a voter's forecasting skill. On the contrary, these biases either pull voters in the wrong direction (e.g., the Democrat who consequently predicts Mondale), or in the right direction by coincidence alone (the Republican who consequently predicts Reagan). Once such biases are set aside, we know that educational attainment and time proximity make a difference. Still, these statistically significant differences are substantively modest. For example, the average standarized regression coefficient (beta weight) for the education variable is 0.07, and for the lead time variable it is 0.04.
In contrast stands the impressive data from Figure 1 , where in several elections 'almost everyone' knew who was going to be elected president. Searching for an explanation of such accuracy, we have extensively probed the determinants of individual forecasting choice, using the National Election Studies. This search netted us some answers, but ones too weak to account for the dramatic forecasting abilities shown in most of these eight elections.
We therefore decided to look at the data in additional ways, from an aggregate perspective. Closer exam ination of the elections in which the public did extremely well in forecasting (e.g., 1964 and 1972) revealed they had something in common -they were lopsided races. The following hypothesis suggested itself: The greater the popular vote share (S) of the presidential winner, the greater the forecasting accuracy of the public (F*). These estimates strongly support the hypothesis. With an increasing margin of victory, it is easier for the electorate to forecast correctly. Voters seem quite responsive to a changing lead, with a 1 percentage point increase accompanying about a 3.5 percentage point advance in forecasting accuracy (see the slope for S). Moreover, the fit of the model is extremely tight, with popular vote share accounting for 90 per cent of the variation in forecasting ability.5
These results are statistically impressive, and say a good deal about the determinants of forecasting ability. In very close races (e.g., 1960) , it is hard to tell who is going to win (even for well-educated voters). In a lop-sided race (e.g., 1984) , it is easy to tell who is going to win (especially for well-educated voters). Other races are in-between, with re-gard to forecasting difficulty. In carrying out the routines of daily life in the midst of an election campaign, voters pick up countless bits of information about which candidate is doing well, which poorly. As the information accumulates in favour of one candidate's prospects, the community arrives at some 'sense' that he will win . The more one-sided the accumulation, the more correct guesses are made about the future winner.
Why did the intriguing finding -closeness of race accounts for most of the forecasting differences -not come out of the individual-level analysis? The reason is because the critical variable -margin of victory (S) -has a fixed value with each election. Thus, it is not a simple contextual effect that can be modelled by assigning a 'margin' variable to respondents in each election survey, for such a variable would necessarily have a constant score in any given survey. Hence, the argument that individuals improve their forecasting ability as the race becomes more lop-sided is tested above on aggregate data. Clearly, the inference from the aggregate results of Equation I to individual forecasting behaviour suggests the limits of the 'ecological fallacy'. In this instance aggregate analysis is more telling than individual analysis, even when the concern is with explanation of individual behaviour. Interestingly, this result parallels the Kramer investigation, when he suggests that the impact of economic conditions on individual voters is better understood with aggregate than with survey data 6 CONCLUSIONS Can the electorate forecast political events accurately? Pre-election voters are generally quite good at correctly guessing the presidential winner, at a fair distance in time from the election itself. This forecasting ability appears explainable by some variables but not others. Surprisingly, political involvement, no matter how measured (participation, interest, media attention, understanding), manifested no influence on forecasting accuracy. Contrary to popular notions, those who are politically on the 'inside' have no special insight about who is going to win. Politics, however, in its more partisan manifestations does help shape a citizen's forecast. In particular, party loyalty and vote intention lead to forecasts based on bias, rather than on judgement.
Nevertheless, there are social and situational attributes which do enhance forecasting ability. In particular, if voters have managed to place themselves high up the educational ladder, or stand not too far away from election day, then they significantly improve their chances of a correct presidential forecast. More important than these circumstances, however, is the tightness of the election contest. When a la ndslide victory is in the offing, virtually everyone knows it, and will tell you so. For closer races, accuracy is less than perfect. Still, barring those few contests that a re neck-and-neck, citizen forecasts of presidential winners are much more than ' lucky guesses'. Citizens see into the political future, at least along this simple dimension. Most voters 'know', before it is decided, who will be president. They do not need a statistical model to generate a reasonable forecast. About all they really need is regular membership of the American polity. What are the implications of this wide-spread forecasting ability? One is that American voters are not idiots. They can answe r an important and complex political question: who will be elected president? Another is that American voters are not cynical: even though they 'know' who will win, they go and vote their convictions. 6 Gerald H. Kramer. The Eco logical Fa ll acy Revisited: Aggregate-versus Individual-Level Findings o n Economics a nd Elections and Sociotropic Voting', American Political Sciellce Review. 77 (1983) .92-11 I.
